

Defense Doc. 1500-A (corrected copy)

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 9 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

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\* Added by Defense

shelf slot #1500-A

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合衆國議會第七九號第一附

員海軍政務廳長共同委員會中隊官第九團發率

陸軍部第九團

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(「真珠湾攻撃」第十四部九二三頁ヨリ)

辯護側追加



D. D. 1500-A-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
18 January 1940.

18 January 1940.

Dear Joe: As of possible interest to you I am enclosing the General Board's report on organization of the Navy Department. Will be glad to get your comments if and when you get time.

I will drop entirely the question of Captain Smith coming to the PENNSYLVANIA for the purpose of acquiring CincC background on war plans.

Before he starts East I will ask him to ask you for an appointment so that you may send back any general thoughts you may wish to of a confidential nature which would be useful to all of us. In this connection I have a letter from Tommy Hart, just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical one. As I have written Bloch, and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually asked him to bear in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this particular period in this old world's history may be far more important to us than the troubles in Europe, especially if something should break and break quickly and without warning. It is something, in my humble opinion, for which you should be mentally prepared. Anything in this wide world I can do to help, of course I will; that is my only reason for existing here. Incidentally by officer messenger or otherwise, I would be glad to know what your thoughts are in that connection so that I may be in harmony and may be able to transmit them to higher authority if they should be asked.

Hope the Army Maneuvers have been greatly beneficial. The President is intensely interested in our working closely with them in all ways, and the pull-together here in the Department is very close.

Best wishes to you all as ever

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, U. S. Navy,  
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,  
USS "Pennsylvania."



辯護圖書類一五〇〇一A一

一九四〇（昭和十五年）年一月十八日附

エツチ・アール・スターク海軍大將よりジェー・オー・リチャードソン海軍大將宛書簡

拝啓

悉らく貴君にとつて興味あるものだと思へ、海軍省の組織に関する總務委員会の報告書と同封致します、何時か暇な時に貴君の批評を聞かせでもらへたら幸ひです。

スミス大佐が司令の戦争計画に關してその情勢を學ばんが爲メンシルバニア號へ來るといふ問題はもう打切りに致します

彼が東部へ出發する前に私は貴君が知らせたいと思ふ内密のことゝ我々すべの役に立つやうなものを傳へてくれるやうに君との意見の取合ひを取計ふように彼に頼むつもりです。序にトミー・ハートが手紙、實は今受取つた計りなのだが、板東の事態は極めて重大であり今年は決定的な危機の年となるだらうと思つて寄越して來ました。



ブロッツクに手紙を送りましたが私が彼に西方へ起りつゝある事を忘れるな  
と常に言つてゐることは貴君も承知のこと、思ひます、何の警告もなく突  
然事が勃發するといふやうな場合には殊に此の古い世界の歴史に於ける此  
の時代にあつて、歐洲の紛争よりも遙かに我々にとつて重要なことかも知  
れませんが、それは、私の卑見によれば貴君が心にその覺悟をしておかなけ  
ればならないこと、この廣い世界に於て私に出来ることなら勿論何  
も致しきすそれこそ私が此處に在る唯一の理由です、それに就ての貴君の  
考が何であるかを將校傳令か何かに依つて知らせて貰へると有難いのです  
がさうすれば私は貴君の意見と私の意見との調和も計られるし上級當局に  
聞かれたら貴君の意見を傳へることも出来ます、  
陸軍の演習で大いに得る所があつたならば幸と存じます、大統領は我々が  
あらゆる點で陸軍と密着に協力することに大いに關心を拂つてゐられます  
省内の團結は非常に緊密です。

皆様にも良ろしく

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）一月十八日

敬具

ペティ

ミンスルバミア號 米陸軍司令長官海軍大將

ジョー・オー・リチャードソン 殿



Exhibit No. 11 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.

EXHIBIT NO. 11

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET  
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/01687

Long Beach, California  
October 16, 1940

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.  
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

Subject: International situation - Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.

Enclosures: (A) Copy of assumptions.  
(B) Copy of tentative operations.

1. During the recent visit of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to Washington and on October 10, the Secretary told the Commander-in-Chief that the President was considering, in connection with possible retaliatory measures taken by Japan against Great Britain upon opening of the Burma Road, the following:

- (a) Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet as a peace-time move.
- (b) Declaring a complete embargo on shipments to and from Japan.
- (c) Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and the Americas. To accomplish this latter measure, he (the President) proposed establishment of patrol lines of light forces from Honolulu westward to the Philippines and a second line roughly from Samoa to Singapore, "in support of" the first line. The impracticability of this and other suggestions was explained to the Secretary, and, after some further conversations dealing with eventualities and at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, and his War Plans Officer in conjunction with the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations' office, submitted a memorandum (Enclosure A) of assumptions outlining the situation presented by the Secretary and a brief outline sketch of operations (Enclosure B) by the U. S. Fleet to meet the assumptions in a more practicable manner. This was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 11 for submission to the Secretary and the President as to what the Navy proposed to do if directed to proceed on the proposed assumptions and tentative decisions.

EXHIBIT NO. 11

CinC File No.  
A16/01687

UNITED STATES FLEET  
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Long Beach, California  
October 16, 1940

Subject: International situation - Reenforcement of  
the Asiatic Fleet.

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2. To date, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has had no further word in regard to the memorandum referred to above, but received a despatch today from the Chief of Naval Operations directing that a copy be forwarded to you via the HOUSTON. It is believed that further study in the Department and in the Fleet will result in some modifications in the operations proposed for the Fleet, particularly as regards distribution of patrol planes and cruisers.

3. The further operations indicated in paragraph 9 of Enclosure (B) are measures for the reduction and occupation of the Marshall Islands, or a feint in the Mid-Pacific which will be initiated when a train is assembled and transports are ready. Due to the situation in the Atlantic, the Department did not feel that our main Fleet should get too far in the Pacific, as it might be necessary to call it back on short notice. It was felt, however, that active operations against ORANGE possessions might have a deterring effect on ORANGE full scale operations in the South China Sea and Dutch East Indies.

4. It will be noted that the above operations parallel very closely the present ORANGE Plan, modified by the despatch of an Advance Force to the Asiatic and further modified by the restriction of main Fleet operations to the Mid-Pacific area.

5. I was further told, in the Department that no Army forces would be available and that the British had agreed to the United States' use of Singapore.

6. In the event that the assumptions are not realized prior to about January 1, 1941, or decision is not reached to despatch the Advance Detachment before that time, there was discussion of assembling a train and transports in West Coast ports and holding a full dress rehearsal of operations against an atoll, as a Fleet exercise utilizing Christmas Island as a site. Steps are being taken for the acquisition and conversion of the necessary transports, etc., to be ready around that time. If this is done, the reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet may take place coincidentally with this exercise, the idea being that Japan will be impressed by this evidence of United States determination to protect its interests. I presume you will be further informed of this eventuality as plans are more fully developed.

7. My secret serial A16/01683 of this date, covering the composition and preparation of the tentative detachment slated for reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, in case such a move is ordered, was forwarded to

EXHIBIT NO. 11

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/01687

Long Beach, California  
October 16, 1940

Subject: International situation - Reenforcement of the  
Asiatic Fleet.

-----  
you by clipper locked box, a copy being sent on the HOUSTON  
with this letter.

8. It is hereby certified that the originator considers  
it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner  
as will permit a classification other than secret.

J. O. RICHARDSON

Copy to: (via airmail)

Opnav (This copy ~~canceled~~ by OpNav despatch  
192000 of Oct. 6)

Defense Note: Portion below signature in handwriting.



Exhibit No. 11

Op-12B-2-MoC

10-11-40

SECRET

MEASURES AND OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S. FLEET

1. Mobilize U. S. Fleet, in accordance with Orange Plan.
2. Redispose forces now in the Atlantic as follows:
  - a. Move 2 heavy cruisers and one division of 4 Old Destroyers to Southern Brazil - Uruguay, and Argentine ports, basing locally or on Falkland Islands in order to interdict ORANGE trade and protection of U. S. Shipping.
  - b. Move 2 heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and 4 destroyers (from Pacific) to cover west coast ports of South America, basing locally or at Panama.
  - c. Move 18 Old Destroyers to Pacific for local defense and protection of U. S. Shipping as follows: -
    - 9 to Puget Sound and Alaska
    - 5 to San Francisco
    - 4 to Hawaii
  - d. Move one aircraft carrier, one light cruiser, two transports, one destroyer tender, all new destroyers, one Destroyer transport, plus 1st Marine Brigade (now at Guantanamo), and three new submarines, and three old submarines to West Coast.
  - e. Move PatWing 5 (\_\_\_planes) with tenders to San Diego for local coastal defense (relieve PatWings 1 and 4).
3. Take measures for defense of Alaska as follows:
  - a. Dispatch two submarines and small tender to Dutch Harbor.
  - b. Reenforce Marine garrison at Dutch Harbor by remainder of defense battalion, housing them in vessels chartered for the purpose.

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SECRET

- c. Dispatch one squadron (6 planes) of Patrol Planes, plus tender, to Dutch Harbor, and one squadron (6 planes) and tender to Kodiak.
4. Prepare a detachment for possible dispatch to East Indies area, consisting of 4 CA, 1 CV, 9 DD, 4 AMD, (Deadiv 51), 1 AC, 1 AD. This force will reenforce U. S. Asiatic Fleet units which will have retired to this area, and will operate in conjunction with British and Dutch Naval Forces. Upon arrival Asiatic waters, this force will report to the Commander-in-Chief, ASIATIC FLEET. (NOTE: - If degaussing and other mobilization measures have not been completed prior to departure, this hazard will have to be accepted, and materials required will have to be forwarded at a later date. In addition, if sent prior to the completion of readiness measures for the operation of the main body in the Mid-Pacific, it must be realized that war may result with this valuable force exposed and unsupported. The same is true of the Asiatic Fleet.
5. Dispatch promptly from Hawaii a detachment consisting of carrier, cruisers, and destroyers to sweep North Pacific waters between Hawaii and Aluetians for Japanese commerce, or Japanese raiders. To be fitted in with mobilization requirements.
6. Assemble transports and train and embark 2nd Reenforced Marine Brigade in West Coast ports.
7. Take measures for defense of Pacific Islands as follows: -
  - a. Reenforce MIDWAY with remainder of Defense Battalion, 2 Patrons, 4 OSS, 1 ASR.
  - b. Operate 2 SS for defense of WAKE.
  - c. Operate 2 SS and 1 Patron with tender from JOHNSTON ISLAND, provide small Marine listening post.
  - d. Operate 6 VP, 1 AVP, and 2 SS for defense of CANTON ISLAND.

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SECRET

- e. Dispatch 2 OSS for defense of SAMOA.
- f. Dispatch 2 Patrons of Patwing ONE to HAWAII (24 Planes) after relief by Patwing FIVE.
- 8. Dispatch remainder of Subrons FOUR and SIX (Approximately 14 SS) to CAROLINES and MARSHALLS for preliminary reconnaissance operations.
- 9. Upon completion of mobilization preparations, assemble Fleet in HAWAII prepared to initiate further measures as the situation requires.
- 10. Assist in defense of U. S. Shipping by the detail of certain Fleet Forces to Coastal Frontier forces. In the Pacific this will be comprise: -
  - 4 DM to HAWAII
  - 3 OCL to Pacific Coastal Frontier.



Exhibit No. 11

SECRET

October 11, 1940

U.S. FLEET Dispositions and Operations to meet special situation in Western Pacific.

ASSUMPTIONS.

1. The Gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.
2. The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of the Burma Road is an act unfriendly to Japan.
3. The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce cooperation with Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.
4. Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce full cooperation by the Dutch East Indies.
5. The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the United States or United States possessions to Japan and non-intercourse with Japan.
6. The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent Japanese trade, in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations, with the Western Hemisphere.
7. The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific, - in Australia and Singapore, - and Dutch forces in the Dutch East Indies in stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea - Celebes Sea area.
8. The United States is prepared to accept war if the measures taken cause Japan to declare war.
9. Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic against the Western Hemisphere by the Axis Powers.
10. The situations and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October, 1940.



眞珠灣攻撃調査聯合委員會書證第一一號  
一合衆國會第七十七議會、第一會期  
ビルマ道路再開ニ關シテ侵略行爲ガ行ハレル場合ヲ考ヘテ日本ヲ遮斷スル  
企圖ニ關シテ「リチャード海軍大將ヨリ「ハート」海軍大將ニ宛テタ  
四〇年昭和十五年十月十六日附覺書  
書證第一一號  
司令長官係存書類綴第

一六／〇一六八七

號

合衆國艦隊旗艦「ニューメキシコ」號

「カリフォルニア、ロングビーチ」ニテ

一九四〇年／昭和十五年／十月十六日

合衆國艦隊司令長官發

合衆國アジア艦隊司令長官宛

題目。國際情勢—アジア艦隊ノ增強

添附文書(1) 假定事項一通

(ロ) 假定作戰一通

一、合衆國艦隊司令長官が最近十月十日「ワシントン」ヲ訪問シタ際國務長官ハ彼ニ對シビルマ道路閉通ニ關連シテイギリスニ對シ日本ガ執ルト思ハル報復手段ニツキ大統領ハ目下次ノ事ニ考案中デアルト語ツタ。

(a) 平時編成替トシテアジア艦隊ヲ增強スルコト

(b) 日本トノ輸出入品ノ完全ナル禁止ヲ宣言スルコト

(c) 日米間ノ全通商ヲ停止スルヨウツトムルコト、コノ最後ノ方策ヲ實現スル爲、彼ハ大統領ハ「ホノルル」カラ西方「フイリツピン」諸島迄輕巡艦隊ノ巡察線ヲ設定コノ第一線ヲ補助スルタメ大略「サモア」島カラ「シンガポール」ニ至ル第二線ヲ設定スルコトヲ提案シタ。コノ提案及ビ他ノ提案ノ實行困難ヲ國務長官ニ對シテ説明シタ。而シテ將來起リ得



ル事ニツイテ更ニ協議ヲ重ネタ後、海軍作戰部長ノ意見ニ從ツテ、司令長官及ビ其參謀ハ海軍作戰部長管下ノ策戰部員ト協同シテ國務長官ノ述べタ狀況ヲ概観シテノ假想事項覺悟ヘ添附書類(四)及ビコノ假定事項ヲヨリ具體的ニスル爲ニ合衆國艦隊作戰計畫案大要ヘ添附書類(五)ヲ提出シタ。コレハ國務長官及ビ大統領ニ提出スル爲ニ十月十一日海軍策戰部長ニ提出サレタモノデ、若シ提案サレタ假想事項及ビ實際的決定事項ニ從ツテ進メルベク指令サレタ場合海軍ノトル方針ニ關スルモノデアツタ。

3

ニ今日迄合衆國艦隊司令長官ハ前述ノ覺悟ニ關シテ何等ノ回答ヲ得ナカツタガ今日海軍作戰部長カラ受取ツタ通知ニヨレバ「ヒューストン」號經由ニテ黃下ニソノ寫シヲ送達スル様指令シタトイコトデアル。海軍省内及ビ遠陸ニ於イテ更ニ研究ヲ重ネレバ艦隊特ニ偵察機及巡洋艦ノ配置ニ關シテ計畫サレタ策戰ヲ若干變改スルコトニナルデアラウト思ハレル。

三、添附書類(五)ノ第九節ニ書イテアルソレヨリ先ノ作戰ハ「マーシャル」群島ノ征服。占領手段デアリ、又輸送隊が集結サレ輸送船ノ用意ガ整ツタ時ニ

始メルベキ中部太平洋ニ於ケル牽制運動デアル。太西洋ノ形勢ニ鑑ミ海軍省ハ我ガ主力艦隊ヲ至急ニ呼ビ戻ス必要ガアルコトヲ考慮シテ太平洋ニ余リ遠スギル地點ヘ出動スルノヲ好マナカツタ。タバシカシ「オレンデ」領土ニ對スル積極的作戰ハ南支那海及蘭領東印度ヲ含ム全面的「オレンデ」作戰ヲ妨害スル結果ニナルカモ知レナイト思ハレタ。

四 上述ノ策戰ハ現「オレンデ」作戰ト非常ニ近似シタモノデアリ後者ニハアジア前衛部隊ノ派遣又更ニ中部太平洋地區ノ主力艦隊策戰制限ガ加ハツテキル。

五 仏ハ更ニ海軍省ニオイテ、陸軍部隊ハ使用出來ナイトイフコト及ビ「イギリス」ハ合衆國ガ「シンガポール」ヲ使用スルノニ同意シタトイフ事ヲ聞イタ。

六 假想ガ一九四一年昭和十六年一月一日頃以前ニ實現シナカツタ場合、又ソノ時迄ニ前進部隊ヲ派遣スル事ニ決定シナイ場合ニハ、西海岸諸港ニ輸送隊及ビ輸送船ヲ集メ「クリスマス」島ノ如キヲ利用シテ艦隊演習トシテ珊瑚環礁ニ對スル完全武裝演習ヲ行フコトヲ討議シタ其頃迄ニコレニ必要ナ

輸送船、其ノ他ヲ手ニ入レ、改装スル手成ヲトツテキル。モシ是ガ行ハレ  
レバ、合衆國ハ目録ノ艦艇ヲ防衛スルトイフ決意ノ證明ヲ日本ニ應ジサセ  
ル爲メニアジア艦隊ノ増強ヲコノ演習ト同時ニ行フノデアル。コノ事ハ計  
畫ヲモツト十分ニ練ツタ上デ詳シク貴下ニ説明スル。

七 同日附私ノ秘密書類A一六〇一六六三號ハアジア艦隊ノ増強ニ關スル命  
令ガ出 夕陽合ノ實戰的部隊ノ編成及ビ準備ニ關スルモノデアルガ「クリ  
ツバ」機ノ嚴封鎖ノ中ニ入レテ貴下ニオダシタ、寫シハコノ手紙ト一語  
ニ「ヒュースト」號デ送ツタ。  
八 鑑者ハコノ書類ハ秘密以外ニハ分類サレテハナラヌ述べ方デアルト考ヘル事  
ヲコ、ニ證スル。

ジエ。オー。リチャードリン

寫（航空便ニテ） O P A V へ

（コノ寫ハ十月六日付一九二〇〇〇號ノ O P N A V 便ニヨル）

辯護側註

下部ニ手記署名アリ



警證第一一號

OP 11230121H00

10111140

秘  
密

合衆國艦隊ノトルベキ手段及ビ作戦

一「オレンヂ」計畫ニ依リ合衆國艦隊ヲ動員ス

ニ現在太西洋ニ在ル軍艦ヲ左ノ如ク再配置ス

(a) 重巡洋艦二隻及ビ舊式驅逐艦四隻ヨリナル一隊ヲ「ブラジル」南部「ウ

ルガイ」「アルゼンチン」ノ諸港ニ遣リ、「オレンヂ」通商ヲ禁ジ、

合衆國船舶ヲ保護スル爲ニ該地又ハ「フォークランド」島ニ基地ヲオク。

(b) 重巡洋艦二隻、航空母艦一隻、驅逐艦四隻ハ太平洋カラ「チ南」「アメリ

カ」ノ西洋岸ノ港ヲ保護スル爲ニ移動シ、該地又ハ「パナマ」ヲ根據地

トスル。

(c) 舊式驅逐艦十八隻ヲ各地ノ防備及ビ合衆國船舶保護ノ爲左ノ通太平洋ニ

移動ス。

九隻ヲ「プューージェットサウンド」及ビ「アラスカ」ヘ

五隻ヲ「サンフランシスコ」ヘ

四隻ヲ「ハワイ」へ

(c) 航空母艦一隻、輕巡洋艦一隻、輸送船二隻、巡母艦一隻、新式驅逐艦全部、第一海兵團へ現在「グアンタナモ」駐在し、戰セタ輸送艦一隻、新式潜水艦三隻ヲ西海岸ニ移動ス。

(d) 「バットウイング」五號——航空機——ヲ共ニ海岸防備ノ爲メ「サン・ディエゴ」ニ移動ス。「バットウイング」一號及四號ト交替セシム

三、左ノ如ク「アラスカ」防禦工作ヲナス

(a) 潜水艦二隻及小型母艦ヲ「ダツチ・ハーヴァー」ニ派遣スル。

(b) 防備大隊ノ殘余ヲソノ目的ノ爲ニ備入レタル船舶ニ宿泊サセテ「ダツチ・ハーヴァー」駐屯ノ海兵隊ヲ増強セシメルコト。

(c) 偵察機一中隊へ六機——ヲ母艦ト共ニ「ダツチ・ハーヴァー」へ一中隊へ六機——及ビ母艦ヲ「コデアク」へ派遣スル。

四、四ケO A、一ケO V、九ケD D、四ケM M D、一ケD E A D I V 五一——一ケA O、一ケA Dヨリ成ル一隊ヲ東印度地區ニ派遣スル積リニテ用意スル事

コノ部隊ハ該地區ニ後進スル合衆國アジア艦隊ヲ増強シ「イギリス」及ビ「オランダ」海軍部隊ト共ニ作戰スル豫定、「アジア」海域ニ到着セバ該部隊ハ「アジア」艦隊司令長官ノ部下ニ入ル。一註、若シ對磁雷防絃材

*the same*

及ビ其ノ他ノ動員手續が出渡前ニ完了シナイ場合ハコノ障害

ハ其儘ニシテオイト必要ナ物資ハ後日輸送スルコトスル、シカノミナラズ、若シ中部太平洋ノ主力部隊作戰ノ準備手段が完了スル前ニ進發セシメタ場合ニハ戰ノ結果ハコノ貴重ナ部隊が危険ニサラサレ無援助ノマ、ニナツテシマフカモ知レナイトイフコトヲ認メナクテハナラナイ。

アジア艦隊ニツイテモ同様デアル。

其「ハワイ」「アリューシャン」同ノ北部太平洋海域カラ日本ノ通商、攻撃ヲ遏止スル爲ニ「ハワイ」ヨリ空母、巡洋艦及ミサイル艦ヨリ成ル派遣隊ヲ急イデ出スコト。戰時裝備ヲナスコト

六、輸送船及ビ輸送隊ヲ集メ、西海岸諸港デ第二増強海兵團ヲ乗船セシムルコト。

七、太平洋諸島防備ノ爲左ノ如キ手段ヲ講ズルコト。



(a) 防衛大隊ノ後部一ケ A S R、四ケ U S S 二ケ分隊デ「ミッドウェイ」ヲ増強スルコト。

(b) 「ウエーキ」島防衛ノ爲ニケ S S チ動カスコト

(c) 「ジョンストン」島カラノ母艦ト共ニ二ケ S S 及ビ一ケ分隊ヲ作戰ニ参加セシメ、海兵團ト應答ヲオクコト。

(d) 「カントン」島防衛ノ爲六ケ V P、一ケ M V P 及ビ二ケ S S チ動カスコト。

(e) 「サモア」島ヲ防衛スル爲ニケ O S S チ送ルコト。

(f) 「バットウイング」五艇ト交替ニ「ハワイ」ヘ「バットウイング」一艇ノ二ケ分隊ヘ二十四艇ヲ送ルコト。

ハ「サフロン」四艇及六艇ヘ約一四ケ S S 一機ヲ應答偵察作戰ノ爲「カロリン」及「マーシャル」ニ送ルコト。

九 動員準備完了後ハ事態ニ即應シテ今後ノ手段ニ着手スル準備ノ爲「ハワイ」ニ艦隊ヲ集合セシメルコト。

一〇 合衆國船艦防衛ノ爲若干ノ艦隊ヨリナル特派隊ヲ以テ沿岸國境部隊ニ増援

サルコト。

太平洋ニ於イテハ以上ガ全部デアル。

四 D M 「ハワイ」へ

三 O G L 太平洋沿岸國院へ

書證第十一號

秘密

一九四〇年昭和十五年十月十一日

西部太平洋ニ於ケル特殊事態ニ相應スル爲ノ合衆國艦隊ノ配置及ビ作戰

假想

一、現在事務局ノ重大性ハ「イギリス」ガ「ビルマ」通路ヲ開通シタ爲ニ増大シタ。

二、日本當局ハ「ビルマ」通路ノ開通ハ、日本ニ非友交的行動デアル聲明又ハ表示スル。

三、日本當局ハ極東ニ於ケル「イギリス」ノ日本トノ協力ヲ強メル爲メニ報復手段ヲトル。

四、日本ハ蘭領東印度ニ完全ナル協力ヲ強ヒルタメニ積極的侵略行動ヲ採ル。

五、合衆國當局ハ合衆國及合衆國領土カラ日本ヘノ物資ノ輸出ヲ完全ニ禁止シ及日本トノ斷交ヲ宣言スル。

六、合衆國當局ハ、外交及海軍行動ニヨリ日本船舶又ハソノ他ノ國ノ船舶ニヨル西半球諸國ト日本トノ通路ヲ阻止セントスル。





ハ合衆國當局ハ西部太平洋即チ「オーストラリア」及ビ「シンガポール」  
ニ於イテハ「イギリス」軍、蘭、領東印度ニ於イテハ「オランダ」軍ヲ援助  
シ、南支那海乃至「セレベス」海以南ノ日本貿易ヲ停止セントスル。  
ハ合衆國ハ、萬一以上ノ手段ニヨリ日本ガ開戦スル場合之ニ應ジル準備ガ  
出来テキル。  
九、「イギリス」ハ樞軸國ガ西半球諸國ニ對シテ西部太西洋ニ於イテ行フ、  
如何ナル海軍ニヨル侵略ヲモ防止スルダロウ。  
一〇、コ、ニ假定セラレタ合衆國ノ立場及ビ決断ハ一九四〇年昭和十五年十月十  
七日ニ實現スル事ニナルデアラウ。

Ref. 25,572

Defense Doc. 1500-A-3

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

(2) 11 July 1941, Subject: Strategic Estimate of the Situation. (Excerpt)

I.B. 103-2

July 11, 1941.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.

Subject: Strategic Estimate of the Situation.

1. At your informal request there are attached revised data on the foreign situation. These data supersede those furnished by 1st Indorsement, May 26, 1941, to your memorandum W.P.D. 4510, May 24, 1941.

SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff,  
G-2

c. British Empire.

(4) In the Far East (Singapore area), there are approximately 4½ divisions, 2 Indian, 1 Australian, and the remainder made up from local forces. At Hong Kong there is approximately a brigade of British troops and a few local units. The Royal Air Force has about 13 squadrons in this area. There are also minor naval forces.

(5) Lines of Action:

To continue on the strategic defensive in all theatres until such time as unforeseen events will permit the offensive, and to seek by every possible means to bring the United States into the war at the earliest possible moment.

(Page 1335 and Page 1339 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(42) 4 December 1941 to OPNAV, Action: ALUSNA TOKYO, BANKOK ASTALUSNA, PEIPING, SHANGHAI.

(42) Top Secret

4 December 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: ALUSNA Tokyo, ALUSNA Bankok, ASTALUSNA Peiping, ASTALUSNA Shanghai

Info: CINCAF, ALUSNA Changking, Com 16

140330

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word Jabberwock. Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language "Boomerang".

(Page 1408, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



海軍文書一五〇〇一△一四

アメリカ合衆国第七十九議会第一會期に於ける珍珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會  
證據書類第三十七號からの抜粋

證據文書第三十七號

四十一 昭和十六年十二月四日 海軍作戦部宛

作戦關係 東京及パンコック、エー・エル・ユー・エス・エヌ・エー

北京及上海エー・エス・テイ・エー・エル・ユー・エス・エヌ・エー

~~三十一~~ 秘密

昭和十六年十二月四日

海軍作戦部宛信

作戦關係 東京、エー・エル・ユー・エス・エヌ・エー・パンコック、エー・エル・ユー

エス・エヌ・エー・北京エー・エス・テイ・エー・エル・ユー・エス・エヌ・エー

上海エー・エス・テイ・エー・エル・ユー・エス・エヌ・エー

情報關係 アメリカ海軍司令長官、軍艦第十六管區エー・エル・ユー・

エス・エヌ・エー



Def. Doc. # 1500-A 4

適宜に本システムを破壊し、破壊し終つたときはジャバーウオックと書いて報告せられたし。OSP一八五、六、一七、一八及本システムを陰にたすべの登録した公表文書を破壊し、破壊し終つたときは明瞭にブイノラッグと書いて報告せられたし



DEF. DOC. #1500 A-7.

Exh. #

3222

RETURN TO ROOM 361  
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM GRAY

TOKYO

Dated May 18, 1939

Rec'd 7:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

234, May 18, 5 p.m.

At my conference today with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Arita handed me the following message which the Prime Minister requested me to deliver personally to the Secretary of State on my forthcoming visit to Washington in the hope that the message may also be brought to the attention of the President:

At present there is a serious antagonism among the nations of Europe and no one can assure that there will be no clash in the near future. If, by mischance, war is to break out, its consequences would be practically beyond our imagination and the indescribable sufferings of hundreds of millions of people as well as the complete

Pg 35,457  
D. D. 1500-B-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
26 January 1940.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  
UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA  
FLAGSHIP

26 Jan. 1940

Dear Betty: -

The remarks in your letter of 18 Jan. about the situation in the Far East, the possibility of something breaking without warning and my need to be mentally prepared are somewhat disquieting.

When the China incident started and on every opportunity until after I left the job as Asst. C.N.O. I used to say to Bill Leahy Be sure to impress on the boss that we do not want to drawn into this unless we have allies so bound to us that they can not leave us in the lurch."

There is a possibility that the constant repetition had something to do with the trip of Ingersoll.

When this understanding was reached it had some value but under present conditions it has little value as it affords us the use of a base in exchange for an obligation to protect about 2½ continents.

I strongly feel that you should repeatedly impress on the boss that an Orange war would probably last some years and cost much money, my guess is 5 to 10 years 35 to 70 Billion dollars.

I have always thought that our Orange Plan was chiefly useful as an exercise in War Planning, to train officers in War Planning and to serve as a basis for asking for appropriations and as a guide for developing our Navy and its shore facilities. As to actually executing the O-1 plan I hope we will never be called on to do that unless the Administration fully realizes the probable cost and duration of such a war and unless our people are prepared to support an expensive war of long duration.

Even if we could take Truk what would we have. A secure anchorage, nothing else, several thousand miles from our nearest drydock and adequate repair facilities and still hundreds of miles from the enemy country. Of course it could not be taken without some underwater damage. To actually put on real pressure we would have to have a real base. That would take many years and much money. We ought not to go into a thing like this unless we expected to see it through.

I hesitate to write you because the written word is so easily misunderstood, also I do not know what your ideas are, what you are telling the boss, what is the meaning of our diplomatic moves, or our Senators talks, or our neutrality patrol. But you are the principal and only Naval Advisor to the boss and he should know that our Fleet can not just sail away lick Orange and be back at home in a year or so. Also the probable cost of any war should be compared the probable value of winning the war.

When we commissioned the San Diego DDs we used the facilities of San Diego Base, Active DD Tenders, ~~or~~

*working parties from active DDs and their*



D. D. 1500-B-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
26 January 1940.

tenders and Mare Island Yard. I think that an excellent job was done but if it had been a real Mobilization, all of these activities would have been fully occupied. How long would it have taken San Diego Base to have done this and its other mobilization work without any outside assistance? A war plan if it is to be executed should be based on realities.

All of this letter may be needless but I know that if you do not tell the boss what you really know and feel about the probable cost and duration in Orange War NOBODY will.

I would hate to see our leaders make a move from which they could not gracefully withdraw, and which would eventually force us into a war, half heartedly supported by our country. In other words before this Nation takes a step I hope we will carefully examine the direction we are heading, where we will eventually go and be prepared to resolutely pursue the course whatever the cost.

I will finish this letter after I see Adm. Sharp and send it to you by him.

/s/ JOR

1 Feb.

I have seen <sup>SHARP</sup>~~Sharp~~ and he has told me about his work on this trip.

The Minor Joint Exercise and Critique have been completed. There was no evidence of any friction or discord. The exercise certainly led the Army to believe that the Navy is highly efficient.

There is danger that many erroneous conclusions will be drawn from this exercise. Of course in actual war we could not have done anything like using all boats from BBs, CLs & CAs for landing. The boats would not have been on board and ships could not have come in shore and stopped for 25 men while lowering boats. There was no sea, no surf and nothing but Ideal weather.

If we ever do anything like this again I hope we have adequate warning, plenty of time, and proper preparation.

I am sending this by Comdr. Curtis.

Hastily

/s/ J O Richardson

Defense Note: In handwriting.



23 Feb

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

C.N.O.

I have not answered this -

Nimitz had a letter from Andrews and wrote him the substance of my letter to Taiffinder -

Then later sent him a copy of my letter to Taiffinder -

In my opinion further reply is not necessary unless to say that Nimitz has written to Andrews -

R.L.E.

Defense Note: In handwriting.

辯護文書一五〇〇一〇

一九四〇年一月二十六日附ジェーラー・リチャードソ

ツチ・アール・スミス提督宛書翰

合衆國艦隊司令長官旗幟ペンシルバニア

一九四〇年一月二十六日



拜啓 一月十八日附貴官 書翰中極東ニ於ケル事態ニ關スル意見事件不  
意發生ノ可能性及ビソレニ對シテ小官ノ覺悟ガ必要デアルトイフコト  
ニハ何カ不安ナモノヲ感スルキマス。

支那事變勃發當時及ビ小官ガ海軍作戰部長トシテ愛ヲ贈リテ後ニ  
ラユル機會ニ於テ小官ハビル。リ―ヒ―ニ對シ常ニ次ノ如ク云ツテ來マ  
シタ。

「我々ヲ窮地ニ置キザリニ出來ナイ程密接ナ關係ニアル同盟國ガ無イ限  
リ我々ハ之ニ卷込マレタカイト云フ事ヲ「ボス」ニ確カニ銘記サセテ  
欲シイ。」

不所ノ反復ハイソルノ旅行ト關係ガアルラシイ。

コノ諒解ヲ得タ時ハソノ價值ガアツタガ、現在ノ狀態デハソレハ一基地ノ使用ヲ許ス代リニ二ツ半ノ大陸ヲ保護スベキ義務ヲ負ハネバナラヌノデ、殆ド價值ガナイ。

小官ハ貴官ガ「ボス」ニ「オレンヂ戦争」ハ多分數年間繼續シ多額ノ費用ヲ要シ、小官ノ推測デハ五年乃至十年三五〇億弗乃至七〇〇億弗デアラウト繰返シテ銘記サセルベキデアル事ヲ痛感スル。

小官ハ常ニ我が「オレンヂ計畫」ガ主トシテ戦争計畫ノ演習トシテ即チ戦争計畫ニ於ケル將校ノ訓練、並ビニ豫算請求ノ基礎トシテ又我が海軍及ビソノ港灣施設發展ノ爲ノ手引トシテ役立ツト云フ意味ニ於テ——有益デアツタト考ヘテ來タ。「〇第一計畫」ヲ實際ニ遂行スルコトニ關シテハ小官ハ政府ガ全面的ニ大体ノ戦費トカ、ル戦争期間間ヲ自覺スルノデナケレバ又我が國民ガ長期費用ノカカル戦争ヲ支持スルダケノ覺悟ガナケレバ我々ハ決シテソレヲ遂行スベク要求サレナイ事ヲ望ムモノデアル。



タトヘ我々ガ「トラック」ヲ獲得シ得タトコロデ得ルモノハ何デアラ  
 ウ。完全ナ礎地ト云フダケノコトデアルシカモソレサヘ我ガ方ニ一  
 番近イ乾船渠及ビ適當ナ修理所カラハ數千哩離レ敵國カラ尙幾百哩モ  
 離レテ居ル。勿論或程度ノ水中ノ損害ナシニハソレヲ獲得スル事ハ出  
 來ナイ。實際ニ壓迫ヲ加ヘル爲ニ我々ハ實質的ナ基地ヲ得ナケレバナ  
 ラナイ。

ソレニハ多年ノ歲月ト多額ノ費用ガカ、ル。我々ハソレガヤリ通セル  
 期待ガ出來ナイナラバコノヤウナ事態ニ立入ルベキテハナイ

小官ハ書面ノ言葉ハ誤解サレ易イノデ貴官ヘ書面ヲ認メル事ヲ躊躇ス  
 ル。ソノ他小官ハ貴官ノ御考ヘガ如何ナルモノデアルカ、貴官ガボス  
 ニ何ヲ語ツテ居ラレルカ我ガ外交、處置又ハ上院議員ノ談話、又ハ中  
 立艦艦ニ就イテ知ラナイカラデアル。

シカシ貴官ハ「ボス」ニ對シテ主ナ唯一ノ海軍顧問デアルカラ彼ハ我ガ  
 艦隊ガ「オレンデ」ヲ貢シテ約一年位デサツサト諸國スルコトハ出來ナ  
 イノダトイフ事ハ知ツテ居ナケレバナラナイ。又如何ナル戦争デモソノ



大凡ノ費用ハ勝利ノ六分ノ價值ニ比較シテ考ヘラレル。

我々ガ「サンディエゴ」艦隊ヲ就役シタ時、サンディエゴ基地、現役艦、現役艦隊、現役艦隊ノ作業隊及ソノ母艦並ビニメア島造船所ヲ使用シタ小官ハコレハ優秀ナ出来栄トデアッタト思フ。シカシ若シソレガ實際ノ動員下ニ行ハレタナラバ之等ノ施設ハ全部使用中デアッタデアラウ「サンディエゴ」基地ハ外部ノ援助無シニ之ヲ爲シ遂ゲ他ノ動員作業ヲスルノデアッタトノ位カカルデアラウ。

賦會計費ハ實現スルタメニハ現實ニ基カネバナラナイ。

コノ警備全体ハ要ラヌコトカモ知レナイガ、若シ實官ガ「オレンヂ戦争」ニ於ケル費用ノ概算及ビ期間ニ就イテ實際ニ知り且感ジテキル事ヲボスニ話サナイナラバ誰モ云フ人ハナイトイフ事ヲ小官ハ知ツテキルノデア

ル。  
小官ハ我ガ指導ヲ違ガ儘面ヲ傷ツケズニ退ケナイ様ナ行動ヲナシ結局我我ヲ國民ノ氣モ進マヌ援助ノ下ニ戦争ニ追ヒ込ムトイフコトハ見ルニ堪ヘナイコトデアアル。決言スレバ我ガ國ガ手ヲ打ツ前ニ我々ハ注意深ク我

我が進ンデキル方向並ビニ如何ナル犧牲ヲ拂ハウトモ斷呼既定方針ニ遵  
スベキソノ目標ヲ見極メル事ヲ望ムモノデアル。  
シヤープ海軍大將ニ會見シテカラ攔筆シ彼ニコノ書翰ヲ托スル事トスル。

印 ジェー、オー、アール

二月一日

5

シヤープト會見、彼ハコノ旅行中ノ仕事ニ就イテ小官ニ語ツタ。  
小聯合演習及ビソノ批評ハ終ツタ。軋轢又ハ不和ノ跡ハ認メラレナイ  
コノ演習ハ陸軍ニ海軍ノ實力ガ十分アル事ヲハッキリト信ジサセタ。  
コノ演習カラ多クノ誤ツタ結論ノ出ル危険ガアル。勿論若シコレガ實  
デアツタナラバ上陸ノ爲ニ輕巡洋艦軍艦ト云ツタ威嚇ヲ全部使用スル様ナ  
事モ出來ナカツタデアラウシ、ボートモ艦上ニナカツタデアラウシ、二十  
五人ノ爲ニ船ヲ岸ニ近ツケテ停船シボートヲ下ロス事モ出來ナカツタデア  
ラウ。

Def Doc 1500-B-1

辯護人註  
筆書

演習ノ際ハ海モ荒レズ波モ無ク理想的ナ天氣デアツタ。  
若シ再ビスカル華ヲ為ル機ナキガアレバ充分ナル警戒ト充分ナル時間  
ト相當ノ準備ヲ望ム。

カーテイス海軍大佐ニ托ス

勿々

印ジエーオー、リチャードソン

Def Doc 1500-B-1

海軍文書一五〇〇一B-1

海軍作戦司令部

作戦部長

小官ハ之ニ對シ返事ヲシナカツタ

ニミツツ」ハ「アンドリユースヨリ書翰ヲ受取り、小官ノタフインダー宛書翰ノ要旨ヲ彼ニ書イタ

其ノ後タフインダー宛ノ寫シヲ彼ニ送ツタ

小官ノ意見デハ「ニミツツ」ガアンドリユース宛書翰ヲ送ツタトイフ以外ソレ以上ノ返事ハ不必要デアル

アール、エル、イー

辯護側注 筆書

二月二十三日



Defense Doc. 1500-B-3

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack -- Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

- (3) 17 July 1941, Subject: Japanese Movement into French Indo-China.  
(Excerpt)

JULY 17, 1941

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:  
Subject: Japanese Movement Into French Indo-China.

.....

2. It is the considered opinion of this Division that this Japanese movement as planned, while opportunistic in conception, was also strategically defensive in character and designed primarily to prevent British and American influence from shutting off supplies of rubber, tin and rice from Thailand and Indo China which are badly needed by Japan.

.....

SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff,

(Page 1342 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯證側文書第一五〇〇號B13

合衆國議會第七九議會第一册

眞珠灣攻撃聯合調査委員會證據書類第三三號抄萃

證據書類第三三號

ワシントンD.C. 州陸軍省G12軍事予想情報

三一九四一年七月十七日

件名 佛印ニ對スル日本ノ動向（抄萃）

一九四一年七月十七日

參謀長宛覺書

件名 佛印ニ對スル日本ノ動向

ニ當部ノ見解ハ今回企テラレタル日本ノ行動ハ一一多分ニソノ構想  
機會主義的ナルモ一一コレ亦戰略上防禦的性質ヲ有シ、主トシテ極



度ニ日本ニ必要トセラル、泰國及佛印ヨリノゴム、錫、米ノ供給ヲ  
英米勢力ニヨリ断タレザルコトヲ企圖スルモノト思料ス。

G 1 2 次席参謀長代理

合衆國陸軍代將

シャーマン・マイルズ

(「真珠灣攻撃」第十四卷 一三四二頁)



Defense Doc. 1500-B-4

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(43) 4 December 1941 to OPNAV, Action: CO MARDET PEIPING CO MARDET TIENTSIN.

(43) Top Secret

4 December 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CO MARDET Peiping, CO MARDET Tientsin

Info: CINCAF, Com 16

040343

Destroy this system at discretion and send word Jabberwock when this has been done. All registered publications except this system must be destroyed immediately by Mardets Peiping and Tientsin and reported by word "Boomerang" in plain language. Use discretion on all other confidential papers.

(Page 1408, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")





辯護側文書一五〇〇一B一四

アメリカ合衆國第七十九議會第一會期に於ける眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員  
會の證據文書第三十七號からの拔萃

證據文書第三十七號

基礎的證據、電報類

(四十三) 昭和十六年十二月四日

海軍作戰部宛

(作戦關係、北京及天津海兵分遣隊司令官

(四十三) 機 密

昭和十六年十二月四日

海軍作戰部發

作戰關係 北京及天津海兵分遣隊司令官

情報關係 第十六管區艦隊司令官

○四〇三四三

適宜に本システムを破棄し、破棄し終つたときはジャバーウオツクと書



いて送られたし。北京及天津の海兵分遣隊は本システム以外のすべての登録した公表文書をすみやかに破棄し、明瞭に「ブローメラング」と書いて報告されたし。  
他のすべての秘密書類に就ても適宜の處置を講ぜられたし。

(「眞珠灣攻撃」第十四卷、第一四〇八頁)

EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT  
COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE  
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- CONGRESS OF THE  
UNITED STATES

PART 3.

PAGE 1229

GENERAL MARSHALL (reading):

The operating of Chinese guerilla forces armed, equipped, and directed by the associated Powers. Steps have already been taken by the British Government to organize such operations. It is recommended that the United States Government organize similar guerilla forces.

SENATOR FERGUSON: Did we ever organize those, to put this plan into effect?

GENERAL MARSHALL: So far as I know, prior to December 7, 194, we did not, as far as I can recollect.

The one action, aside from sending supplies into China, that I do have a very definite recollection of is equipping the air force, the Flying Tigers.

SENATOR FERGUSON: The Volunteer Air Corps?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes; because I took the action to get (3237) them the planes personally.

SENATOR FERGUSON: The Volunteer Air Corps was a force of airmen, combat planes, P-40's, I believe, furnished by the United States, and operated by volunteer officers from the United States, I think, of the Army and Navy, and there may have been even civilians in it. I am not quite certain.

Some of them were reserve officers, and they were relieved from active duty, and released so that they might go into the employ of the Chinese Government.



辯護側文書第一五〇〇號B一五

合衆國眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會審査

第三部

一二二九頁

マーシャル元帥（朗讀）「聯合國ニヨリ武装セラレ、裝備サレ指揮セラレル支那ゲリラ兵力作戦。英國ハ既ニカ、ル作戦ヲ組織スルタメノ手段ヲ種々取ツテ居リ、米國政府モ同様ノゲリラ兵力ヲ編成スルコトガ望マシイノデアリマス。」

フアーギュスン上院議員「斯ル計畫ヲ實行スルタメ、カ、ルモノガ吾々ノ手デ既ニ編成サレテ居リマシタカ。」

マーシャル元帥「私ノ知ル限りデハ一九四一年十二月七日以前ニ於テ編成サレタ覺エハアリマセン。」

支那ニ對スル軍需品輸送以外ニ私ガ明確ニ記憶シテ居リマス唯一ノ行動ハ「フライング・タイガー」部隊ナル空軍ノ裝備ダケデアリマス。」





フアーギユスン上院議員「義勇航空部隊デスカ」

マーシャル元帥「然ウデアリマス。私ハ彼等ノタメニ個人的ニ飛行機ヲ入手スルノヲ援助シタノデ記憶シテ居ルノデアリマス。」

フアギユスン上院議員「義勇航空部隊ハP-40戦闘機ヨリナル航空部隊デアツタト思ヒマス。戦闘機ハ合衆國ヨリ供與サレタモノデ陸軍及ビ海軍ニ屬スル合衆國義勇兵ノ士官ニヨリ操縦サレテ居タト思ヒマス又民間人モ居ツタト思ヒマス。ガ確信ハアリマセン」

右ノ或ルモノハ豫備將校デ中國政府カラ雇傭サレルタメニ現役ヲ解カレテ居リマシタ。」

Excerpt from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
(United States Government Printing Office--Washington: 1946)

Vol. II

Page 475

Saturday, November 24, 1945

Congress of the United States  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of the Pearl Harbor Attack

Washington, D. C.

. . . . .

If the committee will recall, in exhibit 18, introduced yesterday, we placed in evidence President Roosevelt's message to Mr. Churchill concerning the *modus vivendi* which was sent on the basis of a draft prepared by Mr. Hull to which Mr. Roosevelt added the remarks concerning being prepared for real trouble soon, and this message, which I would like to introduce, and have designated as Exhibit 23, is the reply of Mr. Churchill to President Roosevelt forwarded through State Department channels.

The Vice Chairman. Read it into the record.

Mr. Gasell. The message reads as follows:

Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves.

As I indicated, this was in reply to the President's message concerning the *modus vivendi* to Prime Minister Churchill and, of course, relates to that subject.

辭設文書第一五〇〇一B一六號  
眞珠灣攻撃（米國政府印刷局、華盛頓一九四六年）第二卷ヨリノ拔萃  
第四七五頁

一九四五年十一月二十四日土曜

眞珠灣攻撃調査米國議會兩院合同委員會

華盛頓

昨日證據第十八號トシテ「ルーズヴェルト」大統領ノ「チャーチル」首相宛ノ「メッセイチ」ヲ提出シマシタ、右「メッセイチ」ハ「ハル」氏ガ起草シ「ルーズヴェルト」氏ニ於テ近ク來ル眞ノ困難ニ備ハルコトニ關シ筆ヲ加ヘタ暫定協定案デアリマスガ今提出スル證據第二十三號ハ之ニ對シ「チャーチル」氏ガ國務省ヲ通ジ「ルーズヴェルト」大統領ニ爲シタ回答デアリマス。

副委員長

「ゲセル」氏

ソレヲ記錄ニシマス

「メッセイチ」ハ次ノ通りデアリマス。



- 2 -



D. D. 1500-C-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
16 February 1940.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

AIRMAIL  
PERSONAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

San Pedro, California  
25 February 1940

Admiral H. P. Stark, U.S. Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Navy Department  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Betty:

Today I received a despatch from Andrews, a copy of which is enclosed, urging that the information in regard to the change of home ports of vessels of the Hawaiian Detachment be released for publication. This is requested in order that the maximum number of unoccupied houses and apartments at Honolulu may be overhauled and made available for occupancy. I felt constrained to reply negative.

The delicacy with which you must handle this matter is fully appreciated; and the reasons for your negative reply to my previous despatch requesting that the security classification of the despatch changing the home ports of these ships (Opnav 031811 of February 1940) be lowered are fully understood.

It seems to me, however, that the provision of acceptable living accommodations will be highly conducive to contentment and morale. Therefore, I request that the restriction on publicity be eliminated as early as you deem it advisable, and that Andrews and I be informed by despatch.

It may be of interest to you to know that the fact that the home ports of these vessels have been changed appeared in the Los Angeles Times of 4 February under a Honolulu date line, and was subsequently copied in Long Beach and San Diego papers as shown by the enclosure.

It appears that this matter is widely known now, but in view of the restrictions on publicity Andrews probably feels that he can not officially urge private interests in Honolulu to prepare houses for the occupancy of Naval personnel.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ J. O. Richardson

J. O. RICHARDSON

Ref. No. # 1500-C-1

一九四〇年二月十六日附ジェー。オー。リチャードソン海軍大將よりエッチ。...

キヤリホルニア州、サンビドロ港、一九四〇年二月十六日

總司令部書類番號

米國艦隊旗艦ペンシルバニア

ワシントン市コロンビア。デストリクト。海軍省作戰部長  
合衆國海軍大將。エチ。アール。スターク殿

拜啓 今日アンドルースから急便を受取り、寫しを一通同封しました  
右はハワイ派遣艦隊の船舶基地變更に關する情報の公事を促すものです  
これにハワイに於て出來得る限りの不在家屋を調査し、之を宿舍に當て  
るために要請されたものです。が私は否と答へざるを得ませんでした。  
貴君がこの問題を慎重に取扱はねばならぬことは十分之を認めます。之  
等の船舶基地を變更する急便の機密順位を下げてくれるやうにとの前置  
（一九四〇年二月海軍作戰第〇三一八一號）に貴君が否と答へた理由  
も十分判ります。

しかし私には、立派な住宅施設を設けることは満足と志氣の上に大いに

Ref Doc #1500-C-1

貢獻するものだと思はれます。そこでお願いしたいのは、公衆制限の解除を貴君が特筆と考へられるなら出来るだけ早く解除していただき、そしてアンドルースと私に急便で知らせてもらいたいものです。

之等の船舶基地が變更されたことがホノルル日附で二月四日のロスアンゼルスタイムズ紙に掲載され、同封の文から判るやうに、後にロングビーチ・サン・デイエゴ市の新聞に転載されたといふことは貴君にとつて知つておくべき事ではなにかと思ひます。

この明は今や世間周知の事實の如く思はれますが、公衆制限の故に、2  
アンドルースは悉くホノルルに於て海軍要員住宅用の家屋を準備することに公式に私人の關心を促すことが出来ないと思つてゐます。皆様によろしく。

敬 具

一九四〇年二月十六日

カリフォルニア州、サン・ペドロにて

ジェー・オー・リチャードソン

ワシントン市コロムビア・デストリクト海軍省海軍作戦部長

海軍大將 エツチ・アール・スターク殿



Exhibit No. 16 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

Secret

Serial 0130012

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation.

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, November 5, 1941.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided those troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing all<sup>1</sup> naval vessels from the Atlantic except

<sup>1</sup>Preceded by handwritten insertion "practically".



- (a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The only existing<sup>2</sup> plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

<sup>2</sup> Two preceding words struck out, and handwritten word "current" substituted.

(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or South of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i.e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Chief of Staff.

Chief of Naval Operations.

辯護側文書

第一五〇〇一〇一二號

合衆國議會第七十九議會第一會期眞殊灣攻撃調査共同委員會の第十六

號證據書類

證據書類 第十六號 (A) マーシャル陸軍大將及びスターク海軍大將が大

統領に宛てたる「板東情勢に関する調査」と題する一九四一年十一月

五日附書翰

證據書類 第十六號

秘

續 〇一三〇〇一二

ワシントン、一九四一年十一月五日

陸海軍省

大統領宛書翰

題目 板東情勢に関する調査

海軍作戦部長及陸軍參謀部長は板東に於ける軍事情勢を、特に重慶駐  
在大使、マグルー大使節團及び合衆國海軍部官より最近入手せる諸情





報に基き、これが再調査を行つた。

これら實報は、蔣介石の信ずる所として日本軍の昆明攻撃が切迫してゐること及び外部よりの軍事援助特に合衆國及英國兩空軍利用による軍事援助こそこの脅威を挫折せしめる唯一の希望であると指摘してゐる。國務長官は日本軍の昆明及びビルマ公路攻勢に對する政府の

採るべき態度に關し忠言を求めて來た。

日本のビルマ公路攻撃が成功すれば中國中央政府にとつて極めて深刻なる打撃となることは殆ど疑ひが無い。これが爲め同政府今後の有效なる軍事的抵抗の崩壊すら生じ、かくして日本側の「支那事變」解決に至るであらう。若しビルマ公路の利用を喪失するならば、合衆國及英帝國兩國の援助は、數ヶ月間に亘り深刻なる削減を蒙るであらう。また中國政府の抵抗が停止すれば日本軍はその中國駐屯の必要が消じこれら一線はその撤退に要する充分なる時日が経過した後、之を他に轉用することが出来る。



日本軍隊が豫定の攻撃を行ふ爲め、北部印度を基地としてその兵力を集中するには約二ヶ月以上を要する。但し攻撃作戦の緒戦はこれ以前に行はれるやも測り難い。略々三百哩に亘る雄略及び連絡の不充分等により昆明進撃は困難を極めるものとならう。補給線維持も容易では無いであらう。故に中國は防禦に有利なる地勢を利し、地上部隊のみによりこの攻撃を挫折せしめる好機會を有つことになる。但しこれはこれら部隊が質量共に充分なるものとしてのことである。

海軍作戦部長及び陸軍參謀部長が考慮に入れた問題は、合衆國軍隊が日本のビルマ公路遮断を阻害するため日本に對し攻撃的軍事行動に出た際合衆國がその大義名分を明かにし得るか否かといふ點である。兩部長はかくの如き行動は如何に爲装をこらしても結局戦争になるであらうと考へる。

目下の所大平洋に於て無制限な戦略的作戦を行ふことが出来ない。これを行ひ得る爲には海防部隊に割り當てられた艦船を除く海軍艦船の全てを大西洋より引揚げ以て海軍を強化する必要がある。大平洋艦隊の

無制限な攻撃には莫大なる商船を必要とするが、これは目下就役中の重要と看なされてゐる任務よりこれら商船を引揚ることによつてのみ可能であらう。海軍及び商船勢力を大西洋より引揚げれば、その結果、英帝國は、近き將來に於て大西洋の戦斗に敗れることになるかも知れぬ。

□存在する唯一の板東に於ける對日戦争計畫は、英國及オランダと協力して防戦を行ひ、以つてフィリッピン、英領及び荷領東印度を防禦するにある。フィリッピンは目下強化されつつある。現在の陸海空軍混成部隊の兵力に於て之等諸島に對する攻撃は極めて困難なものとなるであらう。フィリッピンに於ける合衆國の空軍兵力及び潜水艦兵力は一九四一年十二月の半ば頃までには臺灣以南に於ける日本軍のいかなる作戦にも對する脅威となるであらう。フィリッピンに於ける合衆國陸軍航空部隊は、一九四二年の二月乃至三月迄には計畫通りの兵力に到達してゐるであらう。この脅威の實力は其時までには、フィリッピン南北兩地域に於ける日本軍の作戦を阻害する上に決定的な要素となる點にまで増強されてゐるであらう。この時までには英國海軍のシンガポール強化も完成

されてゐるであらう。有り得べき日本軍の作戦に對する南方全地域の防衛

總兵力はその時までには印象的な大きさに至るまで達するであらう。

ビルマ鐵路が閉鎖されるが如き時期に至るまでは、對日戦争を惹起する恐れなき手段をもつて、介石に援助の手を差し延べることが出来る。かゝる手段とは即ち、對日經濟壓迫の繼續、貸與の形による武器供給の増強、米國海軍勇將に對する援助繼續及これが増強である。

海軍作戦部長及陸軍參謀部長は次の結論に於て一致してゐる。

(A) 米英參謀會談に於て一致を見た基本的軍事政策及び戰略は依然として妥當である。兩國所期の目的はドイツ打倒にある。日本を敗北せしめても、ドイツが依然として不敗である時は、如何になすべきかはいまだ決定を見てゐない。但し如何なる場合にも無制限なる攻撃的戦争を日本に挑むべきではない。何故ならば斯かる戦争は最も危険なる敵ドイツに對する大西洋に於ける共同努力を弱体化せしめる所大であるからである。

(B) その安全が米國にとり極めて重要な土地を日本が攻襲若しくは直接に脅威するが如き時期までは、極東に於ける防衛勢力を演立しつゝ、日米戦争



を避けるべきである。對日軍事行動は次の如き事件の一つ或はその一つ以上が生じた場合にのみこれを行ふべきである。

(1) 合衆國、英帝國、或は蘭領東印度の領土、乃至はその委任統治領に對する日本軍の直接的戦争行為。

(2) 東緯百度以西或は北緯十度以南の泰、乃至はポルトガル領サモール、ニユーカレドニア、或はローヤルタイー諸島に對する日本軍の侵入

(3) 對日戦争を避けることが出来ないならば、現在の戦争計畫の戦略的線に沿ふべきである。即ち軍事行動は、領土保持及日本の經濟的地位弱化を目的として、主に防禦的たるべきこと。

(4) 世界の戰略上、日本の昆明進駐、前述の場所を除く泰進入、或はロシア文星は、いづれも合衆國の對日干渉を正當化しないであらう。

(5) 實際の對日戦争を除き凡らゆる可能なる援助を中國中央政府に與へなければならぬ。

(6) 對日戦争遂行を決定するに際しては、外交、經濟、軍事各方面に亘る完全なる統一行動を合衆國、英帝國及蘭領東印度が共同して行ふべきである。



海軍作戰部長及び陸軍參謀部長は極東に於ける合衆國の政策は右の結論に基づく可しと建言する。

特に次の點を建言する。

中國に於ける對日干涉の爲めの合衆國軍隊派遣は之を認可せざること。  
中國に對する轉質的援助は、ロシア、英國及自國軍隊の必要に應じて之を増強すること。

米國義勇軍に對する援助は之を繼續し、可能なる範圍に於て最大限に増大すること。

對日最後通牒を發しないこと。

陸軍參謀部長

海軍作戰部長

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT No. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(4) 17 July 1941, Subject: Mobilization of Additional Japanese  
Manpower.  
(Excerpt)

JULY 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower.

.....

3. In view of the fact that the major part of the Japanese Army is pinned down in China without a large mobile reserve and the further fact that the Siberian Army is about twice the size of the Kwantung Army (20-30 Divisions to 12), the strengthening of the Japanese force in Manchoukuo appears to be a logical precautionary procedure.

.....

SHERMAN MILES  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Copy to War Plans Division.

(Pages 1342 - 1343 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

機密側文書第一五〇〇號 G 13

合衆國議會第七九議會第一期

眞珠灣攻撃聯合調査委員會證據書類第三三號抄萃

證據書類第三三號

ワシントン（州）陸軍省 G 12 軍部豫想情報

（四） 一九四一年七月十七日

件名 日本軍追加兵力動員ニ關スル件

一九四一年七月十七日

參謀長宛覺書

件名 日本軍追加兵力動員ニ關スル件

三 日本軍主力が可動ノ豫備軍ヲ持タズシテ支那ニ釘付ケヒラル且シベ  
リヤ軍が關東軍勢力ニ約倍スル（二〇乃至三〇）ヶ師國對十二ヶ師團  
事實ニ鑑ミ滿洲國內日本軍ノ増強ハ、當然ノ豫防手段ナルガ  
如シ

G 2 次席參謀長代理



合衆國陸軍代將

シヤーマン、マイルス

戦時計盤局宛寫

珍珠政第十四卷

一三四二一三四三頁

Def. Doc. #9500-C-2



Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(44) 4 December 1941 to OPNAV, Action: NAVSTA GUAM

(44) Top Secret  
4 December 1941  
From: OPNAV  
Action: NAVSTA Guam  
Info: CINCAF CINCPAC Com 14 Com 16  
Ø42Ø17

Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF CINCPAC Com 14 Com 16 and OPNAV X. Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X. Report crypto channels retained.

(Page 1408, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯護側文書 一五〇〇一〇一四

眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會證據書類

第三十七號拔萃一米國第七十九國會第一會期

證據書類 第三十七號

基礎證據電報書類

(四四) 一九四一年十二月四日海軍作戰部作戰關係、

グアム海軍根據地宛

(四四) 極 秘

一九四一年十二月四日

發信者 海軍作戰部

作戰關係 グアム海軍根據地

連 絡

大西洋艦隊司令長官、太平洋艦隊司令長官

第十四管區司令部、第十六管區司令部

〇四二〇一七



グアム、聯合軍總司令官、太平洋艦隊司令長官、第十四管區司令部、第十六管區司令部、及海軍作戰部との主要連絡に必要な最少限の暗號路を保つ現下の諸目的並びに特殊情報に必須なるものを除き、一切の秘密出版物並びに其他の秘密分類事項を破壊せよ  
一切の保有秘密物件を非常の際に即時破壊出來得る如く準備せよ  
保有暗號路は報告せよ

眞珠灣攻撃

第一四卷一四〇八頁



EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION  
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

EXHIBIT NO. 16 - PAGES 1063 and 1064 - PART 14.

ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FAR EAST IN SUPPORT OF CHINA - At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Following Captain Schuirmann's presentation, Admiral Stark read a Navy Department estimate of the recent dispatches received from Chungking. Admiral Ingersoll, gave his personal review of the situation. A summary of this review was that:

- a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation, made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U.S.-British Staff Conversations Report ABC-1.
- b. A major war effort in the Pacific would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas.
- c. A U.S. war in the Pacific would materially affect United States aid to England.
- d. The requirements in tankers alone for support of a Pacific war would create a serious oil shortage in this country, and the United States fleet cannot be supported in the Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate supplies.
- e. The shortest line of communication is flanked by Mandated Islands, and is vulnerable to Japanese attack. Two other routes are available for communications to the Far Eastern Theater; one via Australia; the other via Cape of Good Hope.
- f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.



g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet due to the lack of adequate anti-aircraft protection for the anchorage.

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launching an attack in five directions; viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States' action should be. In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and army forces, becomes available.

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State Department conference, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be Naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.

def doc 1300-c-5

No. 1

升護側文書 第一五〇〇一五

合衆國議會

真珠湾攻撃調査共同委員会質問  
の抜萃

証據書類第六十一第十四部 一〇六三及一〇六四頁

米國の極東に於ける中國援助行動——

スティーヴン海軍大將の要請により、ニヤッ海軍大佐は十一  
月一日(土曜日)午前に開催の極東情勢を計議した國  
務省會議に執られた行動に、その聲明を行った。ニヤ  
ッ海軍大佐は將介石とマクルーダ大將より來た電報の  
結果この會議を開いたと説明した。その電文は日本の雲南  
經由中國政惠に對する米國が日本に警告を發するやうに  
促し、又米國は大英帝國に日本に對する敵對を全層支  
持するやう促す。この事は秘密にたゞである。彼は大統領  
のケークル氏との海上會談よりの帰還後、十一月七日に大統  
領は日本に對し、これ以上日本が侵略行為に及ぶ場合には  
米國は必要直行動に出ることを得る、という最後通牒を  
發した。この指摘に、彼は更にハル氏は我々が支持するな  
い、彼は警告を幾ら發しても仕方がない、と言見で  
あり、又彼は軍務局は國務省がこれ以上の警告を發  
するのを支持する用意があるか、と知りたく思ふと  
述べた。第三回の會議は國務省に於て十一月二日(日曜

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- 日午前開催。その時英國は泰國に若干の飛行機を送る(ヨ)事及日本に対し三ペリヤ内への移動に対する敬告を發す(ヨ)事。提議された。
- ニ、二大佐の陳述に續いて、スミス海軍大將は最近の重慶電報に同する海軍省の見解を讀み上げた。ミラーは海軍大將は現状に同する個人の評論を述べた。この論說。概略は左通りである。
- 一、數月前に決定した極東情勢に関する決議事項は太平洋に主要な力を注ぐ事及び太平洋に於て止むを得ず戦場場合には制限付攻撃努力を旨とする事と、いふ事がある。
- この政策は米英參謀會談報告書ABC-1に揭載された。
- 二、太平洋に於ける主要戦備は莫大なる船舶量と水空を要するであらう。その船舶量は大西洋及び他の重要地域から廻るべくはならぬ(であらう)。
- 三、太平洋に於ける米國参戦は英國、英國に対する援助に著しく影響する(であらう)。
- 四、太平洋戦争維持。爲、油槽船、要求だけども國內に深刻な石油不足を起すであらう。又補助船舶と十分な補給として米國艦隊を太平洋に於ては維持する(とは出来ない)。
- 五、最短兵站線は本任統治領に側面し日本に攻害(小島、極東戦域への通路に利用し得られるものが他に二つある。その一つは豪洲を經るもの、他一つは希望



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争を起すもつてある

六、艦隊が極東に移動せられると假定しても、ミッドウェイが唯一の地とも修理施設がない。船渠はあるが、併し修繕に必要の機械及施設が現存しない。

七、ミッドウェイは現在、は破泊。爲の通事は対空防禦が不充、爲艦隊にとり安全な根拠地ではない。

この評論は日本は五方面に攻害を開始するに可能であると指摘した。即ちロイヤル・フリー・ポイント、或は雲南、泰國、又ミッドウェイに對してある。日本がミッドウェイに作戦の二つ、或はそれ以上に着手するとしても、いふ事を考慮すれば米國。態度は次如くあるべきである。即ち日本がフリー・ポイント、或は英國及びインドの地、何れかに對し攻害をばした場合、米國はその攻害に抵抗すべきである。日本がフリー・ポイント、泰國、或は雲南、暹羅、又那ト對する攻害をばした場合、米國は宣戰を宣告すべきである。

この觀察はフリー・ポイントに於ける米國軍兵力の増大が殊に潜水艦及び陸軍兵力の増大に關してあるが有效にする迄は米國は極東に於ける攻勢行動を延期すべきであると結んでゐる。

情況討議の中、ミッドウェイの海軍大將は或重要部門に屬する海軍部隊が修理場にあると不在、爲現在の艦隊兵力は非常に不利な状態にあり、現在は早急に適当な時機はないと

思はれると指摘した。更に國務省會議に於て説明し、ミッドウェイ大佐は國務省に嚴重なる警告を發すべきである。即ち米國が即時行動をとることは必要であるとは考へた。

No. 3



No. 4

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と述べたニハに同様に彼は示して、試、其明書、と議上  
 げたい、此大將は國務省が日本が数週間、軍事行  
 動によつて打敗すことを来ると思つてゐると思つた。  
 一に其陸軍大將は極東に於て主關係があるのは海軍  
 であつた、又、彼等、下に海軍は現在太平洋に於て文獻中  
 「ある」と、事實にそれ相合ふ、考慮を拂へてゐると考  
 へた、彼は日本當局は未だ現情勢、下に極度、態度を  
 決定してゐない、情報を知つた、彼が得た情報では日本  
 當局が十五日までに國家を決定するものと予想する事と  
 思はれた、次に彼は分る、陸軍大將、極東に於ける米國軍  
 兵の、合新案を讀み上げ陸軍航空部隊と、現駐屯  
 地、シリヤ、移動せしめる危険を強調し、増大するに  
 陸軍航空部隊がシリヤに於ける限り、シリヤに對し或  
 は南方地域に對する日本、行動は非常に危険な作戦とな  
 るであらう、この彼、確信であつた。  
 彼は十二月半ば迄にはシリヤに於ける陸軍部隊は  
 非常な無力に於てゐる、この事自身日本軍作戦と  
 好むに效果がある、と、確信してゐた。

D. D. 1500-D-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
15 March 1940.

Confidential

15 March 1940.

Dear J. O.: I am somewhat at a loss as to just how to answer your questions (a), (b) and (c) in your letter of 8 March.

I do not know whether Bloch left his personal file of correspondence between him and me, for you to read over or whether he talked it over with you. The background for sending the Hawaiian Detachment was for the most part contained in this personal correspondence.

One of the first questions which was brought to me after I took over this job was the possible reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet which had been requested by Admiral Hart. This reinforcement was to be preferably, according to Hart's request, a division of heavy cruisers. His second choice was a division of light cruisers. The situation in the Shanghai Settlement in regard to control of that area was tense. The situation in Tientsin, especially in regard to British Japanese relations, was critical. The war in Europe was breaking. We wanted to do what we could for Hart, strengthen the State Department's hands, and at the same time not weaken our own position.

I looked into the question of our War Plans, especially as to the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan for an Orange campaign. This seemed to meet a strategic situation in the Pacific in a manner by which Hart would be supported by naval deployment, and the Commander-in-Chief would still have close control over all units of the Fleet.

The result was that on 8 September I wrote to Bloch and made the suggestion of sending a detachment to Hawaii, but only after I had talked it over with the President and the (he) okayed it one hundred percent; as did the State Department.

There were several despatches back and forth (Opnav 0022-1815, 0024-1225, CinCUS 0023-1255, all of September), and also one or two telephone calls. Bloch recommended that Andrews be in command; he also recommended that my first suggestion of moving the submarines to Hawaii be held up; I concurred in both recommendations. Admiral Bloch was opposed to sending any more cruisers to the Asiatic. They were not sent.

We did reinforce the Asiatic by one tender, one squadron of patrol planes and six new submarines. The Hawaiian Detachment fits in with the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan Orange.

When the time came for the Hawaiian Detachment to go, a proposed press release as drawn up showing the reason to be "For the purpose of facilitating training operations." The President finally said: "Do not release it to the press."

Hardly had the Detachment arrived in Hawaii when the question of rotation came up. After a good deal of correspondence back and forth we took the bull by the horns and sent out our directive in regard to this question (CNO Serial 938 or 4 January 1940). Of course the question of home ports and transportation of dependents was a big item in arriving at the final decision.

My original ideas in regard to the Hawaiian Detachment were that possibly, in fact probably, the Commander of this Detachment would be able to carry out the regular schedule of gunnery



D. D. 1500-D-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
15 March 1940.

firings and for training would be able to visit the various island possessions in the Mid-Pacific area to familiarize himself with these possessions and their potential uses in time of war.

I still think that the decision to send the Detachment to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence there may have on the Orange foreign policy. The State Department is strong for the present setup and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.

I find that in the above I have more or less covered your paragraphs (a) and (b). I cannot help but feel that a Vice Admiral should be in command of the Hawaiian Detachment. He would probably command the above force prescribed in War Plans. Administration may be difficult but it will be more difficult in war and means should be developed to offset this difficulty.

In regard to your question (c), of course I don't know whether the President will go to the Coast before his term of office expires or not, but I think the chances are that he very probably will; in fact he intended to go last October and couldn't. At that time he told the people in San Francisco that he would try and come at a later date. My guess is that if world conditions will permit his leaving Washington you will see him sometime before Winter on the West Coast with the desire for a fishing trip, or more possibly a desire to go to Alaska which he has so often expressed. A cruiser force flagship or its equal will be required, because the President will doubtless want to take someone with him. When he went to the Canal Zone in the TUSCALOOSA he was comfortable but he had cut down his entourage to the minimum.

In regard to the relief of the AUGUSTA, I have received your official letter and we are now making a careful study of it from all angles and hope to find a solution which will be satisfactory in the main to both ends.

The decision to retain one division of CAs in the Atlantic was made after considerable discussion with the President. Some would have two divisions. I held one division is enough, supplemented as it is by a couple of CLs. With the general requirement of two cruisers in the Caribbean and two on the North Atlantic Coast, we cannot well do with less. For the time being at least we will have to retain one division of CAs on this side.

I will be glad to get your reply to my letter on the CL Force Flagship. Personally I do not see it - but I am prepared to do what you want.

Every good wish as always and best of luck.

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN  
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,  
USS "Pennsylvania,"  
San Pedro, California.

P.S.--Mr. Edison expects to leave Washington on 26 March and join the Fleet 1 April; leave Hawaii in NASHVILLE 15 April, arrive San Francisco 20 April; inspect San Diego about 24



D. D. 1500-D-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
15 March 1940.

April and return to Washington about 28 April. I do hope you can acquaint him with the Navy on this trip. Deyo will take up the details on his arrival in the West, etc. and you will be acquainted with them later.

def doc 1300-D-1

No. 1

提督ニ宛テタル一九四〇年三月十五日、書翰

嚴秘

一九四〇年三月十五日

親愛ナル、ジエ、オー、君

小生ハ三月八日附貴翰中ニテタル(1) (2) 及び(3)ノ質問ニ對シテ如何  
 返答シタモ、聊カ途方ニ暮シテナルトコロデアル。  
 フロッチ君ガ彼ト小生ト、間ニ往復シタ彼、私信綴ラ貴君カ通  
 讀スル様ニト残シテ行ツタモ、テタルカ、シトモ彼ガ貴君ト話ニ合  
 タモ、テタルカ小生ハ知ラテ、テタル。布哇派遣隊(海軍)遠征、其ノ大  
 部今カ此、私信中ニ含メテ平ク、テタル。  
 小生ガ本職ヲ擔任シタ後、小生ニ課メラシメ最初、問題ハ一ハ  
 提督、要求ニテル亞細亞艦隊、可及的増強デツタ。一ハ  
 要求ニヨル此、増強ハ重巡洋艦、一令隊ヲ要望シテナルモ、  
 テツタ。彼、第二ノ撰擇ハ一令隊、輕巡洋艦デツタ。上海租界  
 取締ニ関シテ、同地域、情勢ハ緊張シテタ。天津、情勢モ特  
 英日關係ニ付テ危機發ト云、所デツタ。歐洲デハ戰端ガ開  
 始サレタ。我々ハ一ハ、爲メ出来得ル限リ、コトヲ爲シ國務  
 省、力ヲ強化シ、同時ニ我々、地位ヲ弱化シ、サルコトヲ欲シタ、デ  
 アル。

小生ハ我ガ戰爭計畫問題、侍司令長官、オシテ戰ニ對スル  
 作戰計畫ニ付テ研究シタ。コシハ、一ハ海軍、展開ニヨリ、又侍  
 然モ司令長官、艦艦隊、全單位ヲ密接ニ統御スルト云  
 様ヲ、海軍ニ太平洋上、戰略的態勢ト一致スルヤウニ思ヒタ。其、  
 結果九月八日小生ハフロッチニ書面ヲ書キ、布哇ニ一令遣隊ヲ派

No. 2

抑々布哇令遣隊<sup>ニ</sup>聞スル小生、考ハコ<sup>ニ</sup>派遣隊、指揮官、止  
現、發砲演習計畫ヲ實施ス且、訓練、爲<sup>ニ</sup>中部太平洋  
域<sup>ニ</sup>ル各島々、領土ヲ觀察ス此、領土<sup>ニ</sup>通曉ス<sup>ニ</sup>戰時<sup>ニ</sup>際<sup>ニ</sup>キ  
ハ其ヲ使用スルコトガ或ハ出来ルヲ知<sup>シ</sup>テ、否<sup>ト</sup>今出来ルコト  
ト云フデヤ、



def doc 1500-D-1

現下、世界情勢ヲハ生ニ今遣隊ヲ派遣スル決定ハ正ニ  
生ニ考ヘ、同地ニ同分遣隊ヲ行ハトガドシテ、影響ヲ有スル  
政策ニ及スベキカハ誰モ判ル、同務省、現任、編成、強ニ支持スル  
ナリト考ヘタル彼等、總ニ、討論新聞発表等、閣下、参劃、審意、ヲ  
テ居ル、以上、以、貴官、ノ、項、ト、内、項、ト、或、ル、程、度、ヲ、査、ミ、ト、思、フ、余、ハ、海、軍、  
中、將、ホ、モ、分、遣、隊、ヲ、指、揮、ス、ル、ト、感、シ、ル、ヲ、得、テ、彼、大、方、戰、争、計、画、  
規、定、サ、レ、タ、上、記、艦、隊、ヲ、指、揮、ス、ル、ハ、管、理、ニ、困、難、ヲ、ル、カ、モ、知、ラ、ル、然、レ、モ、戰、争、  
際、ニ、層、困、難、ニ、ル、コ、ウ、故、ニ、困、難、ヲ、除、キ、ス、ベ、キ、手、段、ヲ、講、ジ、ス、  
コ、ト、ル、

貴官、ノ、聞、ク、ハ、大、統、領、ノ、其、任、期、満、了、前、ニ、太、平、洋、岸、ニ、行、ク、  
否、ハ、勿、論、小、生、ノ、知、ラ、ズ、ガ、行、ク、ス、ル、ト、云、フ、可、能、性、カ、多、ク、今、ア、ル、ト、考、ヘ、  
事、實、昨、年、十、月、彼、行、ク、ヤ、ト、欲、シ、タ、ガ、行、ケ、タ、カ、ラ、タ、リ、テ、ア、ル、去、時、  
ハ、桑、港、ノ、人、々、彼、後、日、行、ク、ヤ、ニ、ミ、ウ、ト、告、ゲ、タ、リ、ア、ル、小、生、ノ、推、測、  
ハ、世、界、情、勢、ガ、彼、華、盛、頓、ノ、離、ル、コ、ト、ヲ、許、ス、ラ、バ、冬、ニ、テ、前、ニ、  
何、時、カ、釣、旅、行、ヲ、希、望、シ、タ、ヲ、知、ラ、フ、ハ、彼、ガ、屋、々、口、ニ、ミ、テ、早、ク、行、ク、  
行、ク、希、望、ヲ、持、テ、手、彼、ハ、西、海、岸、ニ、行、ク、事、ト、思、フ、

巡、洋、艦、隊、ヲ、復、艦、又、ハ、之、ト、同、等、ノ、モ、ガ、要、ム、ヲ、ウ、大、統、領、ノ、命、  
誰、カ、ヲ、隨、行、サ、セ、度、ト、ウ、ウ、ア、フ、彼、ガ、タ、ス、カ、ル、サ、リ、運、河、渡、船、  
行、ク、時、ハ、不、自、由、ハ、カ、ン、タ、ガ、隨、行、員、ハ、之、ヲ、最、少、限、度、ニ、切、詰、  
ス、タ、リ、テ、ア、ル、

No. 3

オ、ー、ガ、ス、號、ノ、交、代、ニ、関、シ、テ、ハ、余、ハ、貴、官、ノ、公、文、書、翰、ノ、交、換、  
我、々、目、下、之、ヲ、ア、ラ、エ、ル、向、度、カ、ハ、慎重、ニ、研究、中、ニ、大、体、之、ニ、同、  
目、的、ニ、満、足、ノ、解、決、ヲ、見、出、ス、ル、ヲ、希、望、ス、ル、

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D. D. 1500-~~P-1~~

Memorandum from Admiral J. O. Richardson for Admiral H. R. Stark - 9 October 1940.

JOR/clp

Confidential

9 OCTOBER 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Points covered in talk with the President

1. Go ahead with assembly of Train.
2. Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four (4) old light cruisers?
3. Give me a chart showing British and French Bases or possible bases for surface ships, submarines or airplanes in Islands in the Pacific, east of the International Date Line.
4. The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical materials, and the British Admiralty felt that they should have officers prepared for staff conferences.
5. The British believe the Germans will attempt to occupy Dakar from Spain over land through Africa.
6. I (F.D.R.) can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast we are not stepping backward.
7. The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light Cruisers to visit Mindinao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed toward sending a stronger force.

/s/ J. O. RICHARDSON



辯護側文書 一五〇〇一D一2

ジェー、オー、リチャードソン提督よりエツチ、アール、スターク提督  
覺書一八九四〇年十月九日

T O R O I P

極 秘

海軍作戰部長宛覺書

大統領との談話中の要點

一、先づ補給船團の集結を行ふべし

二、我方は「サモア」に、舊式輕巡洋艦四隻に滿載し得る十分なる燃料油  
ありや？

三、日附變更線以東の太平洋上の島嶼に於ける英佛兩國の水上艦艇、潜水  
艦及航空機の基地並に其の候補地を示す海圖を送るべし

四、英國大使は「ゴルムレイ」が技術的資料に關する情報を絶へず海軍省  
に送りつつありと述べり。又英國海軍省は將校をして幕僚會議の用意  
を整はしめるべき事を思考せり。





五英國人は獨逸人が陸路「アフ리카」を経て「ダカール」を「スペイン」より奪取せんと試みる事を豫期す。

六余（フランクリン、ルーズベルト）は、戦艦を太平洋岸に持ち來ることとは後退にあらずといふことを米國人や日本政府に得心させるが如き聲明が得られるならば、太平洋岸に戦艦を保有して置くことの利を確信し得。

七大統領は、舊式輕巡洋艦分艦隊を「チエスチエア」として「ミンダナ」訪問に派遣することを承認してもよき旨のめかけり。大統領はより強大なる兵力を派遣することには賛意を表し兼ねるものの如し。

ジエー、オー、リチャードソン（署名）

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(5) 18 July 1941, Subject: New Japanese Cabinet.

I. B. 99

July 18, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:  
Subject: New Japanese Cabinet.

1. A United Press dispatch from Tokyo dated July 18, 1941, states that Prince Konoye has selected the key men for a new and highly militaristic Cabinet. Vital posts are reported as follows:

|                       |                |
|-----------------------|----------------|
| Premier-----          | Prince Konoye  |
| War Minister-----     | General Tojo   |
| Navy Minister-----    | Admiral Oikawa |
| Home Minister-----    | Baron Heranuma |
| Foreign Minister----- | Admiral Toyoda |

2. The first four named above are hold-overs from the former Cabinet. Admiral Toyoda replaces former Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

3. Admiral Toyoda was a protege of the former Admiral Baron Saito (assassinated in 1936 while Premier) and is regarded as a moderate. He is known as a clever, able officer, a specialist in Ordnance, and as having had considerable experience in diplomacy, particularly with the British.

4. The new Cabinet may be regarded as strongly nationalistic, and while probably more moderate and conservative than would have been the case had an Army Officer been given the portfolio as Foreign Minister, it may be that added impulse will be given to Japan's Southward Advance. In this connection, it must be remembered also that Admiral Toyoda has just completed a tour as Minister of Commerce and Industry, and is fully aware of the deplorable condition of Japan's foreign trade and internal economy. He may be expected, therefore, to take steps, as Foreign Minister, which will improve foreign trade conditions since such trade is the life blood of industrial Japan.

SHERMAN HILLES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff,  
G-2.

(Page 1343 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯護側文書第一五〇〇一D一三

眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會議談書類

第三十三號拔萃——米國國會第七十九議會

第一會期

證談書類第三十三號

ワシントンG・O陸軍省312作成陸軍情報判斷。

(6) 一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月十八日、主題、日本の新内閣

1、3、九九 一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月十八日

參謀長に對する覺書

主題、日本の新内閣

一、一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月十八日附東京發の合同通信、至急報は近衛公は高度軍國主義的新内閣の主要人物を決定したと傳へて居る、概要なる椅子は次の如く報ぜられて居る。





なる椅子は次の如く執ぜられてゐる。

總理大臣……………近衛公爵

陸軍大臣……………東條將軍

海軍大臣……………及川提督

内務大臣……………平沼男爵

外務大臣……………豐田提督

二、右の内初めの四名は前内閣よりの留任者である。豐田提督は松岡前外務大臣に交代したのである。

三、豐田提督は故男爵齋藤提督（一九三六年（昭和十一年）首相在任中暗殺さるゝの子分であつて、穩健と考へられて居る。彼は聰明にして、才幹ある武官で、兵器に關する専門家として、且外交特に對英外交に於てかなりの經驗を有する人物として知られて居る。

四、新内閣は非常に國家主義的なものとして考へられ得るが、軍人が外務大臣就任した場合に豫期せられたやうなものよりは多分に穩健、且保守的であると考へられる。しかし日本の兩進は更に促進されるであらう。之に就

「眞珠灣攻撃」 第十四卷一三四三頁

いは、豊田提督が商工大臣としての旅行を終へたばかりであり、日本の  
外國貿易及國內經濟の憂ふべき状態に就て熟知して居ることも併せて記憶  
されなければならぬ。それ故、斯かる外國貿易が日本産業の活力の素で  
あるに鑑み彼が外務大臣として外國貿易の状態を改善する様な處置を採る  
ことが期待される。

米國陸軍代將

G I 2、參謀次長代理

シャーマン・マイルズ

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(45) 6 December 1941 to OPNAV, Action: CINCPAC

(45) Top Secret  
6 December 1941  
From: OPNAV  
Action: CINCPAC  
Info: CINCAF  
061743

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

(Page 1408, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")





辯護側文書 一五〇〇一D一四

眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會證據書類第三十七號拔萃

米國第七十九國會 第一會期

證據書類第三十七號

基礎證據電報書類

(四五) 一九四一年十二月六日海軍作戰部

作戰關係 大平洋司令長官宛

(四五) 極 秘

一九四一年十二月六日

發信者 海軍作戰部

作戰關係 太平洋艦隊司令長官

連絡 太平洋艦隊司令長官

〇六一七四三

國際情勢並に遠隔の我が太平洋諸島の危險に暴かれたる位置に鑑み  
現在又は今後現在以上の非常事態發生の際は秘密書類の破毀を彼等  
に許可し得べし 當面の我が作戰並に特殊情報援助の爲の通信手段



は固より之を最後の瞬間迄維持すべし

（眞珠灣攻撃）第十四卷一四〇八頁）

大英新編万国全图

太平橋鎮聯合教育

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$$\begin{array}{c} \text{J}^{\text{R}} \\ \text{G}^{\text{R}} \\ \text{K}^{\text{R}} \\ \text{H}^{\text{R}} \\ \text{L}^{\text{R}} \\ \text{M}^{\text{R}} \\ \text{N}^{\text{R}} \\ \text{O}^{\text{R}} \end{array}$$

22

大學新聞合氣官

• 42

一九四二年六月織軍聯盟

|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |     |
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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 69 | 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 97 | 98 | 99 | 100 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|

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[illegible]

EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE  
THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION  
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

PART 14

EXHIBIT NO. 18 - PAGES 1133 - 1142

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

November 24, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message to the British Prime Minister containing a description of a proposal for a modus vivendi made by the Japanese Government to this Government and of a suggested alternate modus vivendi which this Government proposes to offer to the Japanese Government.

If you approve of the draft telegram, I shall arrange to have it forwarded.

SIGNED: O H

Enclosure:

Draft telegram

SIGNED:

O K

SEE ADDITION

FDR

\*\*\*\*\*

Telegram Sent

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington November 24, 1941  
11 p.m.

American Embassy  
London (England)  
5392

SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to us proposals for a modus vivendi. He has represented that the conclusion of such a modus vivendi might give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific area and that the domestic political situation in Japan was as acute as to render urgent some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal. The proposal calls for a commitment on the part of Japan to transfer to northern Indochina all the Japanese forces now stationed in southern Indochina pending the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of general peace in the Pacific area when Japan would withdraw all its troops from Indochina, commitments on the part of the United States to supply Japan a required quantity of petroleum products and to refrain from measures prejudicial to Japan's efforts to restore peace with China and mutual commitments to make no armed advance-



ment in the southeastern Asiatic and southern Pacific areas (the formula offered would apparently not exclude advancement into China from Indo-China), to cooperate toward obtaining goods required by either in the Netherlands East Indies and to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the adoption of freezing measures.

This Government proposes to inform the Japanese Government that in the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals contain features not in harmony with the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general settlement and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. It is also proposed to offer to the Japanese Government an alternative proposal for a modus vivendi which will contain mutual pledges of peaceful intent, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement into areas which would include northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, not to replace those forces, to limit those in north Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number shall not be subject to replacement and shall not in any case exceed 25,000 and not to send additional forces to Indo-China. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications, raw cotton up to \$600,000 monthly, petroleum on a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports in general provided that raw silk constitute at least two-thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designated exports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principle of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to approach the British, Dutch and Australian Governments on the question of their taking similar economic measures. Provision is made that the modus vivendi shall remain in force for three months with the understanding that at the instance of either party the two parties shall confer to determine whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area warrant extension of the modus vivendi.

(Written in ink) The British Ambassador has been informed and is informing your Foreign Minister.

Add (A)

SIGNED: ROOSEVELT

SIGNED: HULL

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Washington  
(A)

Add at close

This seems to be a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon.

SIGNED: ROOSEVELT

辯護文書第一五〇〇D-1五

合衆國議會

眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會ニ於テナサレタ審問ヨリノ抜萃

第一四部

書證第一八號一—一三八頁一—一四二頁

ワシントン國務省

通 信

一九四一年十一月二十四日

大統領宛覺書

月本政府ノ作成ニ依ル本政府宛暫定條約申出ノ説明及ビ本政府ガ日  
本政府ニ提出シタ代案暫定條約ノ説明ヲ含ンダ英國總理大臣宛書簡ノ  
草案添付シマスカラ御高覽願ヒ度イ。

若シ貴下ガコノ草案電報ヲ是認ナサルナラハ私ハソレヲ發送スル様次  
取計ラヒマセウ。

同 封

草案電報

署名 オーケー

別紙参照

エフ・ディー・ブール